The endowment effect and beliefs about the market by Achtypi, Elena et al.
The Endowment Effect and Beliefs About the Market
Elena Achtypi
University of Warwick
Nathaniel J. S. Ashby
Harrisburg University of Science and Technology




Technion–Israel Institute of Technology
The endowment effect occurs when people assign a higher value to an item they own than
to the same item when they do not own it, and this effect is often taken to reflect an
ownership-induced change in the intrinsic value people assign to the object. However recent
evidence shows that valuations made by buyers and sellers are influenced by market prices
provided for the individual products, suggesting a role for beliefs about the markets. Here
we elicit individuals’ beliefs about whole distributions of market prices, enabling us to
quantify whether or not a given transaction constitutes a “good deal” and to demonstrate
how an endowment effect may reflect such considerations. In a meta-analysis and three
laboratory experiments, we show for the first time that ownership has no effect on beliefs
about either: (a) the quality of the item or (b) the appropriate market price for the item.
Instead, we show that sellers demand a price for the item that matches their beliefs about
the item’s relative quality and the distribution of market prices in the market. Buyers, in
contrast, offer less than what they believe the appropriate market price is. Thus, we argue
that the endowment effect may largely reflect “adaptively rational” behavior on the part of
both buyers and sellers (given their beliefs about relevant markets) rather than any
ownership-induced bias or change in intrinsic preferences.
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Owners of a consumer good demand more
money in exchange for it than nonowners are
prepared to pay to acquire it—this is the endow-
ment effect. The ratio of sellers’ “willingness to
accept” (WTA; the amount they would require
to part with the object) to buyers’ “willingness
to pay” (WTP; the amount they would pay for
the object) frequently exceeds two, even when
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incentives are used to ensure that people do not
engage in strategic behavior (Horowitz & Mc-
Connell, 2002; Tunçel & Hammitt, 2014).
However, the psychological explanation for this
ubiquitous effect remains unclear (see More-
wedge & Giblin, 2015, for a review). Previous
explanations have assumed that the endowment
effect reflects bias on the part of sellers, buyers,
or both. According to the loss aversion account,
sellers who face the prospect of losing their
possession demand more in compensation for it
than buyers are willing to pay to acquire the
same product (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,
1990) because losses are more psychologically
impactful than gains. Several cognitive and af-
fective processes have been identified to under-
pin this loss aversion. Studies have shown that
emotional attachment to, or psychological own-
ership of, an object drives higher valuations
among the sellers (i.e. owners; Morewedge,
Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009; Shu & Peck,
2011; Walasek, Matthews, & Rakow, 2015;
Walasek, Rakow, & Matthews, 2017). Other
evidence shows that owners and nonowners dif-
fer in their cognitive appraisals of an object,
with buyers generally focusing more on unde-
sirable features of a product and sellers focusing
more on desirable features (Ashby, Dickert, &
Glockner, 2012; Ashby, Walasek, & Glöckner,
2015; Ganzach, 1996; Johnson, Häubl, &
Keinan, 2007; Nayakankuppam & Mishra,
2005; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012).
In this paper, we take a different approach
and consider the possibility that the behavior of
both buyers and sellers is driven at least in part
by their considerations of what constitutes a
good deal for them (Isoni, 2011). Rather than
assuming that ownership status is a source of an
irrational bias, we evaluate whether the amounts
demanded by sellers and offered by buyers re-
flect their personal beliefs about the product’s
relative quality together with their beliefs about
the product’s appropriate position in the broader
distribution of prices in the market. Beliefs
about the market may influence buyers and sell-
ers, as sellers will try to avoid selling a product
for less than its market worth, while buyers will
avoid overpaying for it. We therefore define the
“appropriate market price” as the price that the
product is expected to cost in the market given
its quality.1,2 Our goal is to establish how buy-
ing and selling prices in a typical endowment
effect experiment relate to people’s beliefs
about the broader context of the market for
similar goods. In order to quantify pereceived
good dealness of consumer goods, we elicit par-
ticipants’ individual perceptions of the quality of a
product that they have the opportunity to buy or
sell, and we also elicit their beliefs about the
distribution of market prices for that product or
product type. This methodology enables us to
determine what each person believes the “appro-
priate” price for a product to be, given their beliefs
about market prices for that or similar products.
For example, a decision-maker might believe that
a coffee mug is of high quality (e.g., at the 80th
percentile of the quality distribution) and that the
80th percentile of the distribution of coffee mug
prices corresponds to a price of $6.50. We can
therefore examine how each person’s WTA or
WTP relates to their beliefs about the appropriate
price for a product, as well as establishing whether
ownership status influences individuals’ percep-
tion of quality, their perceptions of market price
distribution, or both. We define participants’ per-
ception of “deal goodness” as their belief about
difference between the relative ranked position of
product’s price within the relevant market price
distribution and the relative rank position of its
quality to similar products. To illustrate, a coffee
mug at the 80th percentile of the quality distribu-
tion on offer at the 60th percentile price clearly
represents a good deal. A 40th percentile (quality)
coffee mug at the 70th percentile price does not. In
the present paper, we examine the relationship
between this quantification of deal goodness and a




Our account extends recent suggestions that
beliefs about the market may be important in
explaining the endowment effect (Brown, 2005;
Isoni, 2011). For example, Isoni (2011) sug-
gests that the discrepancy between sellers’
1 Throughout the paper we use the term “appropriate”
when referring to the market price that one would expect to
pay for an item. It is not a reference to people’s internal
preferences, as a person may not want to pay as much as the
product costs in the shop.
2 We acknowledge that there may be many attributes and
reasons underlying participants’ valuations. In our studies,
we elicit ratings of benefit and quality as these are general
enough to encompass a variety of such considerations.
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WTAs and buyers’ WTPs reflects not an own-
ership-induced difference in underlying prefer-
ences for a target object but rather aversion to a
bad deal. Specifically, buyers are more averse to
the possibility of overpaying for an object than
they are to potentially missing out on acquiring
an object if they fail to offer a high enough
price. However, Isoni (2011) does not offer any
direct evidence that perception of the target
object’s attributes (e.g., its quality and/or the
price it would typically be sold for in the mar-
ketplace) are uninfluenced by the ownership
status, leaving open the possibility of owner-
ship-induced bias in consumers’ perception of
such attributes. Weaver and Frederick (2012)
offer a related account according to which the
endowment effect arises when people’s valua-
tions are lower than the reference price for an
object (reasoning that an object’s reference
price will often be its market price). When
sellers adjust their selling prices to match high
reference prices, their valuations no longer re-
flect only their personal underlying estimates of
the value of ownership. Weaver and Frederick
(2012) report results consistent with this hy-
pothesis. In a series of studies, they showed
their participants retail prices of several prod-
ucts and then asked them to specify how much
they would either pay or sell these items for.
The results revealed that sellers’ valuations
were closer to the retail prices than were the
valuations of buyers. For instance, in two con-
ditions, a candy’s price tag was presented to the
participants as either $4.00 or $1.49. Mean buy-
ing prices for the candy were largely unaffected
by the change in the value on a price tag (being
$1.54 and $1.20, respectively) while selling
prices were highly sensitive to it, being about
80% higher in the high compared to the low
price tag condition ($2.88 compared to $1.58).
Based on these findings, Weaver and Frederick
(2012) concluded that, “Consumers evaluate
potential trades with respect to salient reference
prices, and selling prices (or trading demands)
are elevated because the most common refer-
ence prices—market prices—typically exceed
valuations” (p. 696).
We surveyed the endowment effect literature
for results consistent with those reported by
Weaver and Frederick and conducted a meta-
analysis. More specifically, we were interested
in the differences between market prices and
valuations of owners and nonowners of the con-
sumer goods used in individual studies. Our
expectation was that valuations of sellers will be
typically closer to the market value of an object
than valuations of buyers. We searched for stud-
ies in which buyers’ and sellers’ valuations
were elicited after both groups were shown a
product’s market price. In all 13 studies that we
found (see Table 1, and online supplemental
material for details about literature search), sell-
ing prices tended to be closer to the store price
than did buying prices. A meta-analysis of these
studies indicates that both selling and buying
prices fell below the store prices (Cohen’s d 
0.42, z  15.88, p  .001; Cohen’s d  0.93,
z  27.17, p  .001, respectively). However,
buyers’ downward price deviations from the
store price exceeded sellers’ (Cohen’s d 
.79, z  13.33, p  .001). How can these
results be interpreted? On one hand, the fact that
sellers’ WTAs are close to the market prices
may reflect sellers paying more attention to the
broader context of market prices. Consistent
with this idea, in endowment effect experiments
with monetary gambles (rather than consumer
goods) sellers’ valuations tend to be closer than
buyers’ valuations to the gambles’ actual ex-
pected value (see Yechiam, Ashby, & Pachur,
2017 for a review). Asymmetry of attention
toward the context of market prices would also
be consistent with studies showing that sellers,
but not buyers, are influenced by market price
anchors (Simonson & Drolet, 2004). On the
other hand, the results in Table 1 may simply
reflect the facts that people generally perceive
the market price to be too high and that indi-
vidual valuations reflect endowment-induced
differences in preferences (cf. Weaver & Fred-
erick, 2012). In this case, it should not be sur-
prising that WTAs are nearer to the market price
than WTPs. Despite these possibilities, it is
important to establish how considerations of
deal goodness correspond to the decisions made
by owners and nonowners.
Both Isoni (2011) and Weaver and Frederick
(2012) suggest that the WTA/WTP gap may be
influenced by beliefs about and/or consider-
ations of the market prices (see also Brown,
2005). However, in neither study did the authors
elicit participants’ individual judgments of the
market prices for, or qualities of, objects. This
omission is potentially problematic as people
may hold different beliefs about the broader dis-
tribution of market prices. People may therefore
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differ in what they believe a product costs and
therefore have different opinions on whether a
product and its potential price represent a good
deal. Crucially, it is possible that ownership status
itself can influence participants’ judgments of ei-
ther the quality of an object or the appropriate
price for that object. Such differences could occur
if, for example, sellers focused on particularly
positive attributes of the consumer good that they
own or brought to mind higher prices when con-
sidering a reasonable selling price (Ashby et al.,
2012, 2015; Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Johnson et
al., 2007; Nayakankuppam & Mishra, 2005; Pa-
chur & Scheibehenne, 2012). We offer a novel test
of this possibility in Experiment 1, where we
elicited estimates of market price distributions for
categories of consumer products from individuals
after they found out whether they are owners
(sellers) or nonowners (buyers) of a consumer
product.
We replicated and extended our approach in
Experiment 2, in which we reevaluated the en-
dowment effect with respect to the beliefs held
by buyers and sellers about the market prices
and product’s quality. Specifically, we con-
ducted an incentivized experiment in which we
elicited perceptions of quality and market price
for a consumer good and then used these quan-
tities to match each individual’s perception of
quality onto their beliefs about market price
distribution. This process allows us to identify,
for each individual, expectations about the ap-
propriate price for a product, given the person’s
perception of what the item of a given quality
should cost in the broader market. By compar-
ing this quantity to the WTPs and WTAs, we
can represent valuations in relations to people’s
beliefs about the market. This allows us to de-
termine the extent to which valuations of buyers
and sellers are related to their underlying beliefs
about market values that constitute a good deal.
In Experiment 3, we address several limita-
tions of Experiment 1 and 2, eliciting market
price estimates for a wide range of products and
then asking our participants to value these
goods as buyers or sellers after a 1 week delay.
To foreshadow our results, Experiment 1
finds that even when sellers demand more for a
product than buyers are willing to pay, the two
groups share similar beliefs about the broader
context of market prices. By recovering the
market price position from people’s valuations,
we also show that sellers’ WTAs are relatively
evenly distributed in the market price distribu-
Table 1
Studies Comparing Selling Prices (Willingness-to-Accept; WTA) and Buying Prices (Willingness-to-Pay;
WTP) of Consumer Products Where Participants Were Provided With the Store Price Before Making
Their Pricing Decision
Study Product NWTA/WTP WTA WTP Store price
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990,
Exp 1 Pen 22/22 2.06 0.75 $3.98
Kahneman et al., 1990, Exp. 7 Mug 39/39 7.00 2.00 $6.00
Morrison, 2000 Mug 10/10 2.20 0.99 £1.90
Morrison, 2000 Chocolate bar 10/10 0.31 0.29 £0.33
Arlen, Spitzer, & Talley, 2002 Mug 18/17 4.71 3.14 $5.95
Roth, 2006 Metro ticket 29/28 1.79 (0.15) 1.33 (0.29) €2.20
Weber et al., 2007w Song tracks (self-chosen) 16/16 1.21 (0.89) 0.51 (0.32) €1.29
Knutson et al., 2008w Computer gadgets 24/24 45.87 (13.83) 22.58 (10.37) $70.57
Weaver & Frederick, 2012, Study 1 Candy 55/70 2.23 (1.31) 1.37 (0.93) $2.75
Weaver & Frederick, 2012, Study 2 Mechanical pencil 77/78 1.17 (1.18) 0.80 (0.71) $1.54
Weaver & Frederick, 2012w, Study 4 Chocolate bar 40/40 5.23 (1.88) 3.17 (1.48) $7.50
Abofol, 2016 Grocery products 31/34 8.06 (2.48) 5.95 (3.15) ₪7.93
Gal and Rucker (2017) Watch, notebook, mug,
phone
246/262 166.82 (58.63) 116.50 (54.77) $177
Note. The columns denote the product type, the mean WTA and WTP (in the same currency as the store price), and the
store price. Between-subject standard deviations appear in parenthesis. NWTA/WTP is the ratio of the number of valuations
made by owners to the number made by non-owners.
w  Within-subject design (same individuals performing buying and selling).   Averaged across conditions with the
same product but with varying price tags.
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tions. The WTPs of buyers, on the other hand,
tend to correspond to the lowest market prices
produced by participants. The results of Exper-
iment 3 corroborate these findings as well as the
results of our meta-analysis, showing that
WTAs are much closer to the elicited market
prices than WTPs of buyers. By matching peo-
ple’s personal beliefs about product quality to
their estimates of market price distributions in
Experiment 2, we found that ownership status
had no effect on people’s beliefs about the qual-
ity-appropriate market price (i.e. the Nth per-
centile price for an item judged to be of Nth
percentile quality) for the relevant item. We
also found that the quality-appropriate price for
a product was very similar to sellers’ valuations
but much higher than buyers’ valuations. Over-
all, we found that buyers will only pay to ac-
quire a product at a price that represents a good
deal and hence will offer considerably less than
what they believe the product is worth in the
market. Sellers, in contrast, ask for a price close
to what they believe the product should cost in
the market given their beliefs about its relative
quality. These results are consistent with sug-
gestions that buyers and sellers engage in a
qualitatively different task—buyers are most
concerned about their preferences (typically not
wanting an object) and sellers simply attempt to
estimate the appropriate selling price given their
knowledge of the market (Brown, 2005). We
argue that it is possible to explain the behavior
of sellers by reference to their individual beliefs
about the market and quality. Buyers’ valua-
tions are different, in that they deviate substan-
tially from what the person thinks the product
“should” cost in the market given its quality.
Methodological Statement
In the present article, in addition to the results
of a meta-analysis reported earlier, we summa-
rize the results of three laboratory experiments.
Throughout the article, we report not just con-
ventional frequentist analyses but also Bayesian
analysis, allowing us to quantify evidence for
null hypotheses. We performed all Bayesian
analyses using JASP (JASP Team, 2020, Ver-
sion 0.13.1). Our results can be replicated by
setting seed to 1 with default priors and the
number of samples set (in case of non-
parametric tests) to 10,000. Our data and mate-
rials are available to other researchers from
https://osf.io/jb625/. Institutional ethical ap-
proval was obtained prior to data collection.
Experiment 1
Our initial experiment was modeled on the
standard laboratory methods for demonstrating
the endowment effect, with some extensions. In
addition to collecting WTPs from nonowners
and WTAs from owners of an object, we also
elicit people’s beliefs about the entire distribu-
tion of market prices for a given class of con-
sumer product (here water bottles). This new
methodology allows us to assess how WTPs and
WTAs compare in terms of their relative posi-
tion in the person’s internally stored beliefs
about the broader market. In particular, in order
to assess the notion of deal goodness described
in the introduction, we assess how sellers’ and
buyers’ valuations rank in the wider distribution
of market prices. All exclusion criteria (de-
scribed below) were decided prior to analyzing
the data.
Method
Design. In a between-subjects design, we
compared owners’ (sellers) and nonowners’
(buyers) valuations of a university branded wa-
ter bottle. We also examined their beliefs about
the market price distribution of the same object.
Participants. We recruited 79 participants
using Warwick University’s pool of volunteers
(Mage  20.70, 59% female). Each individual
was promised a flat fee of £3.00 but was told
that, depending on their choices, they could earn
between £0.00 and £20.00 extra. Each session
lasted approximately 20 min.
Procedure and materials. Participants
were tested in groups of maximum size 10. In
any single session, all participants randomly
took on the role of either buyers or sellers.
Sellers were given a brand-new water bottle
with the University of Warwick logo. These
bottles were purchased from the University of
Warwick bookstore (where they were sold for
£6.99). Buyers were told that they would re-
ceive an extra £4.00 (£7.00 in total with the flat
fee of £3.00) for their participation. At this
point, participants were asked to proceed to the
next task—production of random patterns on a
piece of paper and survey questions about that
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task, which took on average 10 min to finish.3
Once this task was completed, sellers were re-
minded that they had been given a water bottle
and that it was theirs to keep. They were also
told that they would have the opportunity to sell
the water bottle if they so desired. Buyers were
asked to examine the water bottle, which the
experimenter had just placed on their desk.
They were told that they had the options of
either buying the bottle and taking it home with
them or keeping all their money.
We used the BDM (Becker, Degroot, &
Marschak, 1964) method to elicit valuations.
Specifically, participants were informed that at
the end of the experiment the computer would
generate a random offer/price for the water bot-
tle. On the subsequent screen, sellers were
asked the minimum price, in pounds, for which
they would be willing to sell their water bottle.
Buyers were asked the highest amount of
money, in pounds, that they would be willing to
pay for the water bottle.
After specifying their WTA or WTP for the
water bottle, we elicited participants’ beliefs
about the prices of similar products in the mar-
ket. Participants were shown an image of two
rows of water bottles. They were asked to imag-
ine that these bottles represented all unique bot-
tles in the market and that they were ordered
from the cheapest (leftmost bottle in the picture)
to the most expensive (rightmost bottle in the
picture). Participants were then asked to give
their best estimate of the price, in pounds, cor-
responding to a specific position in the market.
We used nine percentiles in total (10, 20, 30, 40,
50, 60, 70, 80, and 90). For each percentile,
participants saw a red line indicating a particu-
lar position in the market (see Figure 1). They
were then asked “The line indicates a price.
[percentile]% of all water bottles cost less than
the price indicated by the line, and [1-
percentile]% cost more. What is the price indi-
cated by the line (in British pounds)?” The nine
questions were presented in random order.
The elicitation of the price distribution was
incentivized: The three individuals who gave
the best (i.e. most accurate) estimates for prices
of water bottles were awarded bonus payments
of 15.00, 10.00, and 5.00 pounds for the first,
second and third places, respectively, after all
sessions were concluded. (To enable this, the
responses were compared to real price data for
water bottles extracted from Amazon.co.
uk.—we simply ranked participants with re-
spect to the distance between the mean of the
distribution of Amazon prices and the mean of
the distribution estimated based on their re-
sponses.) After the elicitation of the price dis-
tribution, participants were reminded about the
BDM procedure and that the computer would
now randomly generate an offer/price and com-
pare it with their selling/buying price/offer. The
results of the BDM procedure were shown to
participants, who were then asked to alert the
experimenter. After all transactions were con-
cluded, participants were thanked and de-
briefed.
Results
First, we removed data from one participant
whose valuation (here WTA) was extremely
high (  four SDs from the mean). We also
identified and removed responses from two
participants who did not provide consistent
answers on the distribution elicitation task.
Specifically, we calculated Kendall’s  coef-
ficients to determine whether participants’ re-
sponses were monotonically increasing with
the percentiles of the distribution. We used a
cut-off of 0.7 for this correlation coefficient.
The final sample included 36 sellers and 40
buyers.
We found clear evidence of an endowment
effect: Sellers demanded a median amount of
£4.00 (Range  [£0.05, £20.00]) for the bottle
whereas buyers were willing to pay only £1.00
(Range  [£0.00, 7.50]) to obtain it. The WTA/
WTP ratio of the medians (i.e. 4) is comparable
to that typically obtained in the endowment
effect literature (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002;
Tunçel & Hammitt, 2014)4. The values of WTA
and WTP were found to be significantly differ-
ent according to a Mann–Whitney U test, W 
296, p  .001, r  0.589, 95% CIs[0.734,
0.392]. A Bayesian nonparametric test pro-
duced decisive evidence for a model where buy-
3 Note that we did not ask sellers to do anything with the
water bottle—it was left next to them during the filler task.
We come back to this design feature in Experiment 3.
4 Note that many researchers tend to report means and
standard deviations, and the mean WTA/WTP ratios are
typically closer to 2. However, stated valuations are typi-
cally positively skewed, and medians are therefore better
summaries of the central tendencies.
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ers and sellers produce different valuations of
the water bottle, BF10  253.59.
Figure 2 summarizes the median and average
responses on the distribution elicitation task. It
is evident that participants provided similar es-
timates of the market price distribution of the
water bottles. We tested this with a mixed effect
analysis of variance (ANOVA with Green-
house-Geisser correction), including a between-
subjects factor for condition (buyer vs. seller), a
within-subjects factor for percentile (10 vs. 20,
and so on), and their interaction term. We found
no main effect of condition with F(1, 74) 
0.265, p  .608, partial 2  0.004. As ex-
pected there was a main effect of percentile,
F(2.08, 153.954)  71.584, p  .001, partial
Figure 1. Example question of the elicitation process that was shown to participants. See the
online article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 2. Mean percentile estimates of the market price in Experiment 1. Error bars in the
right panel represent 	 2 standard errors of the mean.
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2  0.492. The interaction term was not sig-
nificant, F(2.08, 153.954)  1.039, p  .358,
partial 2  0.014. For robustness, we also
performed a two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test to compare two distributions, D  0.04,
p  .932.
We conducted a Bayesian version of the
mixed effect ANOVA. Here we found decisive
evidence in favor of the model that included the
main effect of percentile (relative to the null
model), with BF10  2.51 
 10
79. With respect
to the model with the main effect of condition,
we found strong support in favor of the null
model, with BF10  0.220. In other words, our
data were 1/0.220  4.55 more likely to be
observed under the null model. Finally, the
model with main effects of percentile and con-
dition was supported by data more than the
model with the interaction term included,
BF01  1/.022  46.20.
What percentiles of the market price distri-
bution do participants’ WTAs and WTPs corre-
spond to? We computed the rank position of
each participant’s WTA(P) in their elicited dis-
tribution of market prices by fitting a lognormal
distribution to each individual’s responses. In
the fitting process, we used a least-squares para-
metric fit to lognormal inverse cumulative den-
sity functions (CDFs). We then calculated the
rank of each participant’s WTA(P) with that
participant’s fitted distribution.
We found that the average ranked position of
sellers’ WTAs was significantly higher (Me-
dian  0.339, Range  [0; 0.892]) than the
rank of buyers’ WTPs (Median  0.029,
Range  [0; 0.390]), t  6.83, p  .001, d 
1.569, 95% CIs[2.082, 1.049]. The Bayes
factor of BF10  4.23 
 10
6 signifies that the
model with different means among sellers and
buyers is much more likely to be true than the
model in which the two groups have the same
means. This is unsurprising given that we ob-
served a large endowment effect in the absence
of any differences in elicited market price dis-
tributions. All ranks are plotted in Figure 3.
First, it is clear that many owners and nonown-
ers provided a valuation that ranked very low in
their perceived market price distribution of all
water bottles. However, this is particularly ap-
parent among buyers, the majority of whose
valuations ranked extremely low in the respec-
tive market price distributions. Among sellers,
the price demanded for a water bottle corre-
sponded to a wider range of market positions.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we replicated the classic
endowment effect with an incentive compatible
valuation protocol and showed that our distri-
bution elicitation method works well, with only
two participants out of 78 failing to provide us
with a satisfactory level of monotonicity of mar-
ket prices. Our results also showed that buyers
and sellers do not differ in their perception of
market prices. The results therefore provide the
Figure 3. Histograms of WTA(P) ranks within individually fitted market price distributions
in Experiment 1.
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first evidence that ownership status does not
lead to a distorted perception of market prices,
and hence that the endowment effect cannot
reflect any such bias. Instead, we found that
valuations of buyers and sellers ranked differ-
ently in their elicited beliefs about the spread of
the market prices for water bottles. Whereas
sellers’ valuations reflect a wide range of pos-
sible market prices (see Figure 3), the majority
of buyers gave valuations that corresponded to
the lowest prices in the market.
In Experiment 2, we extend the methodology
of Experiment 1 and consider people’s percep-
tion of product’s quality. This allows us to
quantify the degree to which buyers and sellers
differ in their concern with making a good deal.
Experiment 2
The key objective of Experiment 2 was to
understand how people’s WTAs and WTPs re-
late to their estimates of the quality and market
price of the relevant object. Specifically, we
wanted to be able to quantify the amount of
“deal goodness” required by buyers to purchase
an object that they likely have little desire for
and the amount of “deal badness” acceptable by
sellers when giving up the item. To achieve this,
we elicited people’s beliefs (and certainty)
about quality and market price, as well as their
beliefs about the broader market (as in Experi-
ment 1).
Method
Design. The design of Experiment 2 was
identical to that of Experiment 1 with the addition
of two questions: one about the person’s perceived
quality of the water bottle and one about his or her
estimate of the market price for the product. We
counterbalanced the order in which these two sec-
tions were presented (in a 2 
 2 ANOVA, with
condition and ordering as between-subjects vari-
ables, ordering was not a significant factor. We
therefore do not include ordering in the analyses
that follow. See Online Supplemental Table T1,
for a summary of the ANOVA).
Participants. We recruited 92 participants
(Mage  21.90, 63% female) from the University
of Warwick and tested them in groups of 10 or
fewer (not fewer than four per session). Each
individual was promised a flat fee of £3.00 and
was told that, depending on their choices, they
could earn between £0.00 and £20.00 more.
Procedures and materials. The procedure
was the same as in Experiment 1 but extended to
accommodate new measures. Following the mar-
ket price elicitation task, participants also pro-
vided their best estimate of the actual market price
for the target water bottle. To measure the uncer-
tainty in these price estimates, participants also
specified an upper price (that they were 90% cer-
tain the true price was below) and a lower price
(that they were 90% certain the true price was
above). The inclusion of this measure was moti-
vated by the possibility that buyers and sellers
may differ in their uncertainty about the true mar-
ket price. One possibility is that sellers are less
certain in their estimates and hence that their val-
uation is motivated by the possibility that a prod-
uct could cost more in the market. We compared
the lower and upper bounds of the estimated mar-
ket prices to test for this possibility.
Next, we elicited estimates of the quality of the
water bottle. Participants were shown a new pic-
ture of all water bottles in the market, but now
ordered by their quality (see Figure 4). Partici-
pants were told that at the high-end, water bottles
had the most features and were made of the best
materials, and at the low-end, they had the fewest
features and were made of the poorest materials.
They were then asked to indicate, by clicking on
the appropriate region of the scale, where they
Figure 4. Quality rank question as shown to participants. See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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believed the water bottle that they were given (or
offered) ranked in terms of quality.
The rank participants gave was represented by a
green rectangle on the graphic. After providing
their point estimates participants were asked to
give low and high estimates of the water bottle’s
quality such that they were 90% sure the water
bottle’s quality fell above the low estimate and
below the high estimate. These estimates were
also made using the graphical interface shown in
Figure 4.
Results
We excluded two participants based on the
same criteria as were employed in Experiment
1. None of the participants provided us with
extreme WTA/WTP values, but responses of
two individuals were removed due to poor con-
sistency in the distribution elicitation task (Ken-
dall   0.7). In total the sample consisted of 47
sellers and 43 buyers.
As in Experiment 1, we found a clear endow-
ment effect. Summary statistics and relevant
tests (both frequentist and Bayesian) are re-
ported in Table 2.
The WTA/WTP median ratio of 1.92 was
smaller than the ratio of 4 found in Experiment
1, but the difference between the groups was
significant, with decisive evidence in support of
the model with different valuations of buyers
and sellers (BF10  16).
With respect to the stated market price, we
found strong support for there being no differ-
ence between the groups. However, sellers pro-
vided higher upper bounds for the market price
than buyers did. We found no difference for the
lower bound of the market price, although the
evidence here was not conclusive in the Bayes-
ian analysis.
Next, we examined responses from the mar-
ket price elicitation task. Figure 5 shows mean
responses for each percentile, separately for
buyers and sellers.
Visually, the results closely mimic findings
from Experiment 1 (see Figure 2). In a 2 (con-
dition) by 9 (percentile) mixed ANOVA, we
find a main effect of percentile, F(1.326, 116.
677)  125.205, p  .001, partial 2  0.587,
no main effect of condition, F(1, 88)  0.340,
p  .562, partial 2  0.004, and no significant
interaction, F(1.326, 116.677)  0.941, p 
.359, partial 2  0.011. The results of the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test were consistent,
with D  0.07, p  .276.
The Bayesian version of this test provides us
with quantitative support for the null hypothe-
sis. First, we found decisive evidence in favor of
the model containing the main effect of percen-
tile, with BF10  1.045 
 10
126. However, we
found strong support for the null model relative
to the model with the main effect of condition:
BF10  0.225. The data were 1/0.225  4.44
Table 2
Summary Statistics and Pairwise Comparisons for Stated and Inferred Valuations of the Water Bottles in
Experiment 2
Outcome variable
Buyers: Sellers Mann-Whitney U test Bayes factor
(BF10)Median [Range] Median [Range] (W, p)
Stated values
Stated price £2.50 [£0.00; £8.50] £4.80 [£0.00; £15.00] W  616.5, p  .001 16.149
Market price £5.00 [£1.00; £12.95] £5.00 [£1.50; £15.00] W  958.5, p  .676 0.254
Lower market price £3.00 [£0.50; £12.00] £3.00 [£0.00; £90.00] W  829.5, p  .142 0.457
Upper market price £8.00 [£1.00; £20.00] £9.00 [£3.50; £50.00] W  741.5, p  .029 3.338
Quality rank 0.3 [0.1; 0.7] 0.35 [0.1; 0.8] W  822.5, p  .128 0.718
Lower quality rank 0.15 [0.05; 0.35] 0.20 [0.05; 0.80] W  771.5, p  .052 1.440
Upper quality rank 0.45 [0.15; 1] 0.75 [0.20; 1] W  641.5, p  .003 10.137
Inferred values
Valuation rank 0.055 [0; 0.814] 0.212 [0; 0.942] W  581.0, p  .001 28.527
QMP £5.58 [£1.57; £21.57] £5.45 [£1.00; £14.93] W  950.0, p  .628 0.246
LQMP £3.93 [£1.12; £18.93] £4.25 [£0.73; £13.97] W  918.0, p  .459 0.263
HQMP £8.58 [£2.09; £31.52] £8.96 [£1.37; £57.92] W  876.0, p  .281 0.397
Note. QMP  quality matched price; LQMP  lower quality matched price; HQMP  high quality matched price.
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times more likely under the null model. Lastly,
we found strong evidence in favor of the main
effect only model over the model with a two-
way interaction: BF01  1/.012  83.33.
Taken together, data from Experiment 1 and
2 indicate that the elicited distributions of mar-
ket prices do not differ between buyers and
sellers. The same holds true if people state the
market price explicitly. We observe some dif-
ferences in the stated uncertainty expressed by
buyers and sellers, although this effect is small
in magnitude.
How did participants’ valuations rank in the
elicited market price distributions? For each
participant, we fitted a lognormal distribution
and calculated the rank position of their WTA/
WTP within these distributions of market pric-
es. In Figure 6, ranks of buyers and sellers’
prices are plotted next to each other. The lower
section of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics
and the results of inferential statistics compar-
ing buyers with sellers.
Consistent with Experiment 1, we find clear
evidence of a difference in ranks. Once again, a
large proportion of buyers’ valuations had ex-
tremely low ranks in the market price distribu-
tions, whereas sellers’ prices were more evenly
distributed across possible prices. Clearly, ac-
ceptable amounts among sellers match onto a
range of potential market prices, whereas the
maximum that buyers are willing to offer cor-
responded to very low (often the lowest) market
price for similar category of products.
Quality rank. Table 2 summarizes the data
for the median judged quality rank and for the
upper and lower ends of the participant’s 90%
confidence cut-offs. Although we found no sig-
nificant difference between buyers and sellers in
judged rank of quality, we found strong evi-
dence that the lower and upper ranks differ
Figure 5. Mean percentile estimates of the market price in Experiment 2. Error bars in the
right panel represent 	 2 standard errors of the mean.
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between groups: Sellers provided higher cut-
offs for the lower and upper end of the quality
interval.
Good dealness. With the information about
people’s valuations, perceived quality ranks,
and beliefs about the distribution of market
prices, we can examine participants’ implied
beliefs about good dealness. Specifically, we
can match a person’s quality rank to that per-
son’s market price distribution to obtain the
amount of money that a person believes a prod-
uct should cost in the market.
We computed the quality-matched price in
the following way. For each participant, we
took their estimate of the ranked quality of the
water bottle and found the market price that
occupies the corresponding rank position in the
distribution that represents that participant’s be-
liefs about the market. For example, if a person
stated that the water bottle was at the 30th per-
centile for quality, we calculated the 30th per-
centile price in the distribution of market prices
that we elicited from that participant. We refer
to this estimate as the quality matched price
(QMP). In the same fashion, we obtained the
high quality matched price (HQMP) and lower
quality matched price (LQMP) that correspond
to the lower and upper bounds of the confidence
intervals provided by the participant. More for-
mally, if F1(e; , ) is the fitted lognormal
inverse CDF for a participant’s elicited market
price distribution, where e is the percentile and
() are the parameters for the lognormal dis-
tribution, then the quality matched price, QMP,
is related to the quality rank QR by: QMP 
F1(QR; , ). In the bottom portion of Table
2, we report QMP, HQMP and LQMP, respec-
tively. We found strong support for the sugges-
tion that the QMP and LQMP are no different
between buyers and sellers. For HQMP, we also
find no difference, but the strength of evidence
is less convincing, with Bayes analysis favoring
the null model with BF10  2.00.
It is evident that the estimates of the quality
matched prices are very similar to participants’
estimates of the market prices of the product
(see Table 2). Buyers and sellers agreed with
respect to the market price of the water bottle
(median of 5 in both groups), but their beliefs
about the appropriate price for the product,
given their beliefs about its quality, were very
near to these values (with median values of
£5.58 for buyers and £5.45 for sellers). There
was therefore a high degree of coherence in
participants’ estimates: Their direct estimates of
the market price for the water bottle correspond
to their estimates of the water bottle quality
Figure 6. Histograms of WTA(P) ranks within individually fitted market price distributions
in Experiment 2.
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combined with their beliefs about the market
price distributions of water bottles’ prices.
We summarize our results in Figure 7, which
shows median stated market prices, quality
matched prices, and actual stated valuation
(WTA or WTP) of our participants.
We interpret the results in terms of our quanti-
fication of deal goodness described earlier. On
average, sellers estimated the water bottle to be at
the 35th percentile of the quality distribution and
were prepared to accept the 21st percentile of the
market price distribution for it. Buyers estimated
the water bottle to lie at the 30th percentile of the
quality distribution yet were prepared to pay
merely the 5.5th percentile price. We interpret
these results to indicate that buyers are only will-
ing to purchase the good if they can acquire it at a
considerable discount/as a good deal.
Further support for the good dealness explana-
tion comes from the correlations between the es-
timated market prices and valuations provided by
our participants. We found that WTPs are posi-
tively correlated with stated market prices,
r(41)  0.49, p  .001, and so are WTAs, r(45) 
0.76, p  .001.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicates findings of Experi-
ment 1, showing that buyers and sellers do not
differ with respect to their beliefs about the
market price distributions. Once again, ranks of
valuations within these distributions differed
markedly between the groups, such that buyers
were only willing to pay a low market price for
the water bottle while sellers’ valuations corre-
sponded to a wider (and higher) range of market
prices. Experiment 2 also extends results of
Experiment 1 by quantifying good dealness
considerations among buyers and sellers. More
specifically, we found that buyers and sellers
agree on what the water bottle should cost,
given its quality and given a broader market
context. Yet, buyers were willing to pay much
less than these amounts to acquire the water
bottle.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 1 and 2 are con-
sistent with the notion that buyers and sellers
differ in their consideration of good dealness.
However, these studies have a number of limi-
tations, which Experiment 3 seeks to address.
First, the duration of ownership differs between
the conditions in Experiment 1 and 2. Sellers
were exposed to the water bottle for longer than
buyers, and this feature of the experimental
design can increase the WTA/WTP ratio (Reb
Figure 7. Valuations of buyers and sellers together with elicited market prices and estimated
appropriate prices for the water bottle. Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
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& Connolly, 2007; Strahilevitz & Loewenstein,
1998). For this reason, in Experiment 3, the
exposure to products was held constant. The
second concern is that our experiments were
limited to a single consumer good—university-
branded water bottles. Although mugs with
University logos have been often used in en-
dowment effect studies, it is important to show
that our results replicate for other products as
well. To address this, Experiment 3 uses a wider
range of consumer goods. Third, there is a risk
of a carryover effect in our studies, whereby
participants provide valuations and market esti-
mates in a single session. In Experiment 3, we
separated valuations from estimation by a pe-
riod of at least two weeks.
Beyond these modifications, Experiment 3
has two more distinct features. First, instead of
asking participants to provide a single point
estimate of the market price, we elicit a distri-
bution representing participants’ beliefs about
the plausible market prices for each product.
With this indirect measure of the perceived mar-
ket price, we then take the midpoint of this
distribution as our measure of people’s per-
ceived market value for the consumer good. Our
focal hypothesis is that these estimates of the
market price will be closer to the valuations of
sellers (WTAs) than buyers (WTPs). Second,
the results of Experiment 1 and 2 (as well as
findings of Weaver & Frederick, 2012) suggest
that the BDM procedure may not work as in-
tended, with buyers and sellers considering dif-
ferent things when evaluating consumer goods
in a typical experimental setting. It could there-
fore be that many participants allocated to the
condition of buyers are simply uninterested in a
particular object and therefore provide valua-
tions very close to £0. To explore this further,
we included a binary question asking partici-
pants whether they want to engage in a trans-
action at all before they could provide valua-
tions of the goods (both for buyers and sellers).
Method
Design. Our participants were assigned to
the role of a buyer or seller of 10 consumer
goods. All individuals were asked to answer
questions about market prices for those prod-
ucts and to specify their selling or buying price
for each item.
Participants. A total of 84 participants
took part in the two-session study (Mage 
24.74; 45% female). Each experimental session
lasted approximately 15–30 min. Every individ-
ual was given £6.50 in each of the two sessions
for their participation (£13.00 total). In addition,
to further incentivize their decisions, eight par-
ticipants were selected at random, and one of
their decisions was carried out for real (see
below for details).
Materials and procedure. Products con-
sisted of 10 common consumer goods (e.g.,
tongs, spatula, plate) found on Amazon.co.uk.
All products had a listing price of less than
£20.00 and had positive average reviews (i.e.
three or more stars on average). The experiment
was programmed using Real Studio, 2012 r2.1.
The experiment consisted of two sessions. In
the first session, which was the same for all
participants as they were only subsequently
treated as buyers or sellers, participants were
presented with an image of each product (in
random order) and asked to indicate what they
thought the highest and lowest store price for
the product was (see top panel of Figure 8).
Participants were then asked to provide a dis-
tribution of store prices for each product. Spe-
cifically, they saw 10 equally spaced bins span-
ning the range from the low to the high price
they had provided earlier. For each bin, partic-
ipants had to indicate how many out of 100
stores (in five store increments) they expected
the product would be sold for in the given price
range (see bottom panel of Figure 8). Next, for
validation purposes, participants indicated the
benefits of the product on a scale ranging from
5 (totally unbeneficial) to 5 (totally benefi-
cial). After all products were evaluated partici-
pants were paid for their time and reminded to
attend the second session.
In the second session—which occurred at
least 7 (but no more than 20) days after the first
session—participants were randomly assigned
to the role of either buyer (N  39) or seller
(N  45). Buyers were told that there was a
10% chance they would be given £20.00 and
that their task was to provide buying prices for
10 different products. When entering each buy-
ing price, a checkbox was presented that partic-
ipants could use to indicate if they did not want
to engage in a transaction involving a given
product. By checking the box, participants
could indicate that they did not want to buy the
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product at all (equivalent to WTP  0). If a
participant was randomly selected to receive
£20.00 at the end of the study, one of the
products was selected at random. If they had
indicated they did not want to buy the randomly
selected product, they were given the £20.00.
Otherwise a random amount between 0 and
£20.00 was drawn by the program. If the
amount drawn was less or equal to the buying
price provided, participants received the prod-
uct and £20.00 minus the amount drawn. If the
random amount was greater than their buying
price, they were given the £20.00. This method
is a variant of the incentive compatible methods
of eliciting valuations commonly used in the
endowment effect literature (BDM method;
Becker et al., 1964).
Sellers were told that there was a 10% chance
that one of the products they provided a selling
price for would be given to them. As in the
buying condition, when entering each selling
price, a checkbox was present that allowed par-
ticipants to indicate if they did not want to sell
a given product for any price. If a participant
was selected to take part in the transaction at
the end of the study, one product was ran-
Figure 8. Procedure for estimating distribution of store prices for a single product. Top: first
stage, where participants indicated the minimal and maximal store prices. Bottom: second
stage, where participants filled in the distribution of equally spaced price intervals. See the
online article for the color version of this figure.
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domly chosen. If they had indicated they did
not want to sell the product, it was given to
them. Otherwise a random amount between
£0.00 and £20.00 was drawn. If the random
amount drawn was equal to or larger than
their indicated selling price they received the
drawn amount; otherwise they received the
product.
After providing buying or selling prices for
all 10 products, participants were thanked for
their time, debriefed, and paid. Buyers and sell-
ers whose decisions were incentivized were in-
formed via e-mail that they could come in and
pick up their money and/or product.
Results
We removed data from one buyer who failed
to answer a majority (80%) of questions. As a
result, our experiment contains 83 participants
who each provided 10 valuations and 10 esti-
mates of market prices (1,660 responses in to-
tal). There were two missing entries in total
(0.12%). In seven responses (0.42% of the
data), participants’ store prices were more than
four standard deviations (SDs) above the mean
store price (based on valuations from all partic-
ipants). These responses were removed from the
data. For the analysis of WTP and WTA 3/1,660
responses (0.36% of the data) were similarly
excluded due to being four standard deviations
above the mean of the elicited price. Thus in
total, we had 1,648 valuations and market price
estimates.
Overall, products were evaluated as benefi-
cial (Median  1.50; Range  [1.66, 3.26]),
with no significant difference in the rated ben-
efit for those participants who were randomly
allocated to be buyers (Median  1.36;
Range  [1.66, 3.26]) or sellers (Median 
1.65; Range  [0.75, 3.05]), W  759, p 
.383, r  0.112, 95% CIs[0.348, 0.137].
Moreover, a Bayesian analysis indicated posi-
tive evidence for the absence of a difference
(BF10  0.278). Table 3 shows the buying,
selling, and estimated store prices for each of
the 10 products. Consistent with the endowment
effect, the median selling prices (across all
products; Median  £2.70; Range  [£1.22,
£8.60]) were higher than the median buying
prices (across all products; Median  £2.11;
Range  [£0.60, £5.10]). We tested this using a
2 (condition: buyers vs. sellers) by 10 (product
type) mixed effect analysis of variance
(ANOVA). In the analysis, we used log trans-
formed valuations due to non-normality of peo-
ple’s stated buying and selling prices. The re-
sults revealed a main effect of ownership status,
F(1, 79)  4.385, p  .039, partial 2  0.053,
and a significant main effect of product type,
F(6.95, 549.07)  14.00, p  .001, partial 2 
0.151. There was no significant interaction be-
tween these variables, indicating that the size of
Table 3
Results of Experiment 3: Median Selling Prices (Willingness-to-Accept; WTA), Buying Prices (Willingness-
to-Pay; WTP), Median Estimated Store Prices Based on the Distributions Reported by the Participants,














1. plate 2.50 3.23 0.33 0.305 3.276 2.00 2.91 0.68 0.615
2. spoon 2.00 2.60 0.27 0.174 5.733 2.00 2.51 1.01 31.179
3. wineglass 4.00 3.70 0.61 0.193 5.183 3.00 3.81 1.09 155.519
4. spatula 2.50 2.51 0.02 0.163 6.116 2.00 2.74 0.76 91.113
5. tongs 3.00 3.11 0.59 2.488 0.402 2.50 3.71 1.39 339.513
6. spatula (2) 2.00 2.36 0.20 0.214 4.668 1.90 2.44 0.79 874.438
7. bowl 3.00 3.01 0.33 0.632 1.581 2.05 3.41 1.31 3.474
8. dish scrubber 1.50 2.01 0.51 0.944 1.059 1.50 1.80 0.60 9.784
9. coffee cup 3.00 2.91 0.01 0.166 6.026 2.00 3.06 0.69 39.735
10. rolling pin 3.00 3.26 0.51 2.973 0.336 2.40 3.39 0.84 258.807
Note. In order to simplify the interpretation of the Bayes factors, we included a transformation such that BF01  1/BF10
when testing the difference between sellers’ valuations and stated market prices.
For the one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests:  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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the endowment effect did not vary across the
product types, F(6.95, 549.07)  1.256, p 
.270, partial 2  0.016. Taken together, we
found that sellers always demanded more for
the products than buyers were willing to pay,
but the difference was rather small.
The results of the Bayesian ANOVA are con-
sistent with these results. There was strong sup-
port for the model with the effect of product
type, with BF10  1.029 
 10
18. There was
strong support for the model including owner-
ship status and product type main effects, with
BF10  1.633 
 10
18. The model with main
effects only was 33.44 times more likely than
the model with main effects and the interaction.
We next examined the relation between val-
uations and estimated store prices. Table 3
shows the median valuation and median store
prices for each product. Across all products,
medians for WTPs and WTAs were always
lower than the median estimates of the market
price. We compared differences between valu-
ations (WTPs and WTAs) and market prices
using one sample t tests (H0 being that the
difference is 0). Relevant Bayes factors are re-
ported in the Table 3, showing substantial evi-
dence, for all products but one, that the differ-
ences between WTPs and market prices are
larger than 0 (here also negative). In contrast,
for eight products we found substantial evi-
dence in the favor of the null hypothesis, sup-
porting the prediction that there is no difference
between valuation (WTA) and estimates of the
market price. Together, these results are largely
consistent with the previous finding showing
that selling prices are close to the products’
market prices.
We further examined whether the price of a
given product (relative to other products) is
associated more strongly with the median store
price for sellers than for buyers. We computed
correlations to test whether sellers or buyers
who indicated high median store price also in-
dicated higher WTA/WTP across different
products. The median estimated store prices
were correlated with valuations of sellers,
r(444)  0.63, p  .001 and, to a lesser extent,
with valuations of buyers, r(370)  0.57, p 
.001.
Finally, we analyzed the number of products
that participants indicated that they wanted to
buy or sell at the price they provided. Sellers
chose to sell a median of 4 (Range  [0, 9]) out
of the 10 products, while buyers chose to buy a
median of 1 (Range  [0, 10]) products; a
significant difference, W  1312, p  .001, r 
0.535, 95% CIs[0.332, 0.690], BF10  99.003.
Therefore, buyers not only departed from the
market price of the products but also displayed
lower willingness to consider an exchange.
Discussion
Across a wide range of products, we find that
the valuations of sellers are nearer to their per-
ceived market worth than the valuations of buy-
ers are. This is in line with the results of our
meta-analysis. Notably, however, we demon-
strate this finding remains after controlling for
the amount of exposure to the product experi-
enced by buyers and sellers and using an indi-
rect method of eliciting the point estimate of the
product’s market price. In addition, we find that
buyers are more likely not to want to engage in
the transaction than sellers. In other words, buy-
ers indicate that they are not interested in the
transaction at all more often than sellers do.
General Discussion
We explored the hypothesis that valuations of
buyers and sellers may reflect their differing
beliefs about the broader market of prices and
products (Brown, 2005; Isoni, 2011; Weaver &
Frederick, 2012). Specifically, we developed a
novel quantification of deal goodness in terms
of the rank-based difference between the “ap-
propriate” price (generated by the quality
matched process) and the WTA and WTP mon-
etary valuations. In terms of this good-dealness
consideration, the endowment effect emerges
because, given they will typically lack any
strong desire to possess the object, buyers are
only willing to purchase a product if they get a
very good deal (relatively low market price
given products’ quality). Sellers valuations, on
the other hand, should correspond closely to the
expected market price for a given good. Indeed,
we show that sellers are willing to accept prices
that correspond to their beliefs about what the
given product should cost in the broader market.
Buyers do not differ significantly from sellers in
their beliefs about the market but are willing to
pay substantially less than they believe the
product costs in the market.
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In Experiment 1, using a distribution elicita-
tion task, we set out to determine whether be-
liefs about the distributions of market prices for
a given class of consumer products (here water
bottles) differ as a function of ownership status.
We found no evidence of such a bias (see also
Experiment 3 in Walasek, Yu, & Lagnado,
2018). In addition, we demonstrated that while
both buyers and sellers value the object at less
than its market price, buyers have a strong ten-
dency to provide WTP amounts that correspond
to the lowest end of the market price distribu-
tion. In Experiment 2, we replicated these find-
ings and additionally found that owners and
nonowners do not differ in their estimates of the
product’s quality (in terms of how its quality
ranks among other similar products). Moreover,
owners and nonowners produced similar esti-
mates of the product’s actual market price. Us-
ing a wide range of consumer products, valua-
tions of sellers in Experiment 3 were closer to
the estimated market price of each good than
valuations of buyers were.
Our results are comparable to the findings
reported in studies of the endowment effect for
risky and ambiguous gambles. Sellers, not buy-
ers, tend to set the minimum selling price to be
close to the actual objective worth of a risky
asset (Yechiam, Abofol, & Pachur, 2017; Ye-
chiam et al., 2017). Although in the present
study we cannot make any statement about the
ideal price of a consumer good for each person,
our findings show that sellers’ valuations align
with their perception of what the item should be
worth as a product in the marketplace. Our
results therefore extend previous efforts beyond
the context of gambles.
Our study builds on and extends recent ac-
counts suggesting that the endowment effect is
at least in part driven by the considerations of
what constitutes a good deal. This account dif-
fers from traditional explanations of the endow-
ment effect in several key respects. Most im-
portantly, unlike many accounts based on
concepts such as loss aversion, our account does
not assume ownership-induced changes in peo-
ple’s valuations of the object if such valuation is
defined in terms of underlying preferences
(rather than, e.g., the profit that could possibly
be made by selling it). In this respect, our ac-
count is similar to that of Isoni (2011). How-
ever, unlike Isoni, we do not need to assume
“bad deal aversion” in that we do not require
any asymmetry in hedonic impact of under- and
overpaying. Of course, we do not discount the
possibility that ownership status can influence
people’s valuations via mechanisms such as
asymmetric attention (Ashby, Walasek, &
Glöckner, 2015; Carmon & Ariely, 2000) or
psychological ownership (Walasek et al., 2015;
Walasek et al., 2017).
It is important to note that our results do not
provide direct causal evidence for the relation
between perceptions of good dealness and val-
uations of owners and nonowners. Instead, our
account is mostly descriptive—we illustrate
how valuations of buyers and sellers map onto
participants’ beliefs about the product and the
broader context of the consumer market. By
doing so, we can show patterns of valuations
that fit well with recent theoretical and experi-
mental developments in which the behavior of
buyers and sellers is largely dictated by their
consideration of how to secure (avoid) a good
(bad) deal. Past work and our own results thus
align with a simple pragmatic explanation of the
endowment effect. When participants come to
the lab and are offered a chance to purchase
some consumer good, most people do not want
it, even at a substantial discount (relative to its
potential market value). Sellers on the other
hand, value the product appropriately given on
their knowledge of the market. If this account
correctly captures people’s reasoning, there is
no need to invoke any psychological biases,
such as loss aversion, to explain the endowment
effect. We do not provide direct evidence
against loss aversion explanation of the endow-
ment effect but rather offer an alternative ex-
planation of the valuation gap. The conclusion
of most researchers (i.e. that the endowment
effect reflects loss aversion) is based on the
assumption that participants’ valuations reveal
their true underlying preferences, which are in
turn assumed to be uncontaminated by strategic
considerations or beliefs about the market. This
assumption stands in contrast with the finding
that even in an incentivized experiment, many
buyers and sellers admit that their valuations
were motivated by “seeking a good deal” or a
consideration of a “reasonable or compromise
price” and “selling cheaply to make sale likely”
(for sellers, Brown, 2005). Further research is
necessary to show how buyers and sellers might
be differently influenced by their beliefs about
the broader market. One potential extension of
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the present study would be to manipulate beliefs
about the market. Using products that are less
known among the participants, we would expect
that valuations of sellers would be much more
influenced than those of buyers by such a ma-
nipulation. The evidence presented by Weaver
and Frederick (2012) is consistent with this
prediction. Although our results do not disprove
a role of loss aversion in the endowment effect,
our alternative account suggests that the as-
sumption of loss aversion is not necessary. We
therefore suggest that explanations of the en-
dowment effect in terms of loss aversion be
discounted until and unless specific evidence
for loss aversion is forthcoming. We argue that
our account is parsimonious because it explains
both the endowment effect and sellers’ greater
sensitivity to observed market prices in terms of
the difference between buyers’ and sellers’ be-
liefs about relevant markets without requiring
the additional assumption of loss aversion (as
postulated for instance by Weaver & Frederick,
2012).
In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that buyers
and sellers did not differ in terms of how they
rated the products on quality and benefit, re-
spectively. These findings appear difficult to
reconcile with the idea that endowment effect
emerges, at least in part, due to the sense of
emotional attachment that develops among
owners (Shu & Peck, 2011; Walasek et al.,
2015). Indeed, participants who own an object
have been shown in other studies to rate an
object more favorably than nonowners—a phe-
nomenon known as the mere ownership effect
(Beggan, 1992). One plausible explanation for
our results is that our design did not provide
owners with enough opportunity (or reason) to
develop any meaningful sense of psychological
ownership. Even in the case of Experiment 2,
where owners had more contact with the prod-
uct than nonowners, such a short duration of
ownership could simply be insufficient to gen-
erate any special bond between an individual
and a consumer good.
The idea that perception of good dealness is
an important influence on stated buying and
selling prices has wider implications concerning
the use of incentive compatible procedure like
the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) to elicit true
valuations. If the amount that people are willing
to sell or buy an item for reflects market con-
siderations relating to appropriate prices for an
item of that quality, rather than or as well as an
individual’s desire to possess the object, the
valuations obtained using BDM-like procedures
cannot be interpreted as unbiased measures of
underlying preferences. At the very least, our
results suggest that sellers and buyers engage in
the valuation task differently, with sellers intu-
itively considering broader context of the mar-
ket in making their decisions.
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